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ENDOGENOUS GROWTH, DECLINE IN  SOCIAL CAPITAL AND  
EXPANSION OF MARKET ACTIVITIES
Abstract: We model in an endogenous growth set-up the hypotheses that the expansion of market 
activities weakens social capital formation and that firms can invest in formal mechanisms of 
control and enforcement to substitute for social capital (trust, work ethics, honesty). The model 
shows that the economy tends to grow faster when it is relatively poorer in social capital and that 
perpetual growth can be consistent with the progressive erosion of social capital. These results may 
help to reconcile Putnam’s claim that social capital has declined in the U.S. with the satisfactory 
growth performance of the U.S. over the same period.
Keywords: Generalized trust, externalities, marketization, social assets. 
JEL Classification numbers: O13, O41, Q20, Z13.
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1.   INTRODUCTION
Defining social capital as those features of social organizations that facilitate coordination 
and cooperation (specifically, values and norms of reciprocity inherent in one’s social networks), 
one should expect that members of communities with high stocks of social capital would be more 
able to monitor one another’s behavior costlessly, reach informal understanding and agreements, 
enforce contracts, and resolve disputes amicably. In such communities, the incidence of litigation, 
corruption, conflicts and crime should be low, transaction costs should be reduced, and market 
activities should be facilitated. 
This claim that social capital is important for market efficiency is linked in this paper to the 
idea that the greatest danger to the social capital arises from the market itself. This idea has a long 
history, and some authors went so far as to maintain that the decline of the values (honesty, business 
ethics, trust…) that prevent the spread of the opportunism generated by a market society will end up 
destroying the latter (Hirsch 1976, Hirschman 1982).1 According to them, the progressive 
weakening of the cultural and ethical base of a market economy is a consequence of its evolution 
and success since the individualistic and competitive values system connected with the expansion of 
a market economy is the greatest threa  to the efficient functioning of markets. A complementary 
thesis is that in a society that becomes more complex and differentiated, impersonal relations 
increasingly replace face-to-face interactions, thus undermining the possibility of founding 
economic transactions on interpersonal trust (see Hardin 1998). Also Putnam (2000) links the 
marked decline in social capital that he documents to have occurred in the United States in the last 
                                               
1 Fukuyama (1995) fully embraces the idea that capitalism tends to erode social capital but offers an optimistic view of 
its ability to regenerate that capital. The perception that there is a conflict between a development strategy advocating a 
stronger role for social capital and an agenda emphasizing market incentives and material values is present also in 
current policy debates (see, e.g., Heyer et al. 2002). At the same time, the idea that any development process brings 
destruction of social capital has been recently challenged by studies focusing on specific episodes and experiences (see, 
e.g., Miguel et al., 2006).
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decades to socio-economic transformations that one can consider by-products of the process of 
marketization.2 Indeed, he identifies some possible determinants of this decline in the rising female 
participation in the labor market, in the increase in geographical mobility, in “the replacement of the 
corner grocery by the supermarket” and in the “privatizing” or “individualizing” of the leisure time 
(mainly due to the TV and to the diffusion of other home-entertainment technologies). More 
generally, some have argued that as income rises and the size of the middle class expands, many 
retreat from highly motivated social idealism and civic engagement to pursue personal objectives.3
However, some striking evidence presented by Putnam (2000) to support his claim that 
social trust has steadily declined in the US in the last decades (i.e. documenting the explosive 
increase in the society’s expenditures in formal activities of social control and dispute resolution)4 is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the erosion of social capital stimulates the rapid growth of those 
sectors of the economy which provide services that economic agents use to protect themselves 
against increasing opportunistic and defiant behavior by others. The growth of these sectors is 
surely related to the long-term rise in the “transaction cost sector” that was illustrated by Wallis and 
North (1986) for the U.S. economy.5 Moreover, this growth, which is paralleled by the decline in 
                                               
2 The general thesis that social capital has declined in the United States, documented by Skocpol (1999) and Putnam 
(2000), was already presented by Putnam (1995), raising a critical debate. Some researchers (see, e.g., Ladd 1996,
Paxton 1999) contested Putnam’s conclusions. Subsequent studies tend to confirm Putnam’s main thesis (see, e.g.,   
Costa and Kahn, 2003, Kolodinsky et al.  2003, Keele 2005).    
3 This point was suggested by a referee, who interprets this modification of attitudes and ideologies as a consequence of 
the evolution of the “shared mental models” that individuals construct to make sense of the world around them (see 
Denzau and North 1994).
4 Putnam (2000) emphasizes that during the 1980s, spending on security rose rapidly as a share of U.S. GDP. Moreover, 
he observes that by 1995 America had 40% more police and guards and 150% more lawyers and judges than would 
have been projected in 1970, even given the growth of population and the economy (see Putnam, 2000, 146).
5 Wallis and North estimated that the transaction cost sector (private plus public) amounted to 26.1% of U.S. GDP in 
1870 and to 54.7% in 1970.
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peer monitoring and informal sanctioning, can be considered a symptom of the increasingly explicit 
nature of norm enforcement that proceeds with modernization (see Bowles and Jayadev 2006).6
Summarizing, the progressive “marketization” of social life, namely the process through 
which market relations become more pervasive, contributes to the diffusion of values, attitudes and 
behavior that do not favor the formation of social capital. In turn, the decline in social capital 
induces the economic agents to use more market services as substitutes for the diminished flow of 
services provided by it.7 The resources devoted to this use are subtracted from other productive 
uses, but at the same time they counterbalance the negative effect of a lower social capital on the 
productivity of inputs such as labor, human and physical capital.
It should be clear from the previous discussion that in analyzing the impact of a decline in 
social capital on economic growth, one must consider not only its depressing consequences for 
factor productivity but also its stimulus to the expansion of market activities. One should also 
account for the self-feeding process whereby this expansion has a further negative effect on the 
formation of social capital. The original model presented in this paper contains all these features. 
Furthermore, taking for granted that there has been a decline in U.S. social capital, it may help to 
explain why, especially in the 1990s, this fall in social capital does not appear to have been 
paralleled in the United States by a disappointing growth performance. Indeed, this stylized fact 
seems at odds with Putnam’s statement that social capital produces “aggregate economic growth” 
(Putnam 2000, 322-3). Also Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004, 12) stress this point: “Putnam (2000), 
focusing on the U.S. experience since the 1950s, argues that social capital, defined as membership 
in formal and informal clubs, has declined monotonically since the 1950s. This is true for all states, 
all decades and all measures of social capital. However, he finds no relationship between the speed 
of the decline of social capital and economic performance across U.S. states or across time periods. 
                                               
6 Bowles and Jayadev document that supervisors and guards (police, corrections officials and security personnel) were 
17.9% of the U.S. labor force in 2002, while the corresponding figure was 10.8% in 1966.
7 The expenditures for these market services can be interpreted as defensive expenditures.
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Further, the relationship between social capital and socioeconomic outcomes is even harder to 
characterize when one looks at subperiods. For example, the 1990s were a period of rapid economic 
growth in the U.S. yet it was also a period of rapid decline in social capital, at least based on the 
sorts of measures he uses. To be clear, Putnam does attempt to associate higher social capital with 
better socioeconomic outcomes, our point is that the relationship between the two for the United 
States is even at first glance relatively complicated”.8 Moreover, both Durlauf (2002b) and 
Bovenberg (2003) complained about the absence of theoretical models that define precisely the 
mechanisms through which endogenous and exogenous variables interact and co-determine the time 
profile of social capital and of other indicators of economic performance.9
We contribute to fill this void by presenting an endogenous growth model that links social 
capital formation to the decisions by which economic agents determine their working time, 
accumulate human and physical capital and may substitute market services for the services provided 
by  social capital.  The model combines the idea that knowledge and productivity gains are achieved 
by each firm through (human and physical) capital utilization and spill over across all firms with the 
idea that the expansion of market production by each firm has negative externalities on the 
                                               
8 The existence of a systematic relationship between social capital and economic performance across U.S. states is 
questioned by Casey and Christ (2002): their regression analysis incorporates state-level measures of physical and 
human capital, showing that the connection between social capital index measures and output indicators is either 
negative or statistically insignificant. In contrast, Rupasingha et al. (2002) find evidence that higher levels of social 
capital (together with other economic and social factors) have systematic and positive effects on growth rates among 
U.S. counties. In general, cross-sectional studies appear to show the existence of a positive relation between social 
capital (generally measured in terms of generalized trust and associational activity) and economic growth (Knack and 
Keefer 1997, La Porta et al. 1997, Zak and Knack 2001, Beugelsdijk et al. 2004, Beugelsdijk and van Schaik 2005).
However, these studies have been subject to severe criticism (Durlauf 2002a, Durlauf and Fafchamps 2004).
9 A recent theoretical model that focuses on the relation between social capital and economic growth,  (Beugelsdijk and 
Smulders (2004), accounts for the possible trade off between social capital formation and GDP growth. 
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formation of social capital.10 Within this framework, it is shown that perpetual growth can be 
possible even if social capital (which enters the aggregate production function) is progressively 
eroded and that in the long run, an economy that grows faster tends to be relatively poorer in social 
capital and to exhibit a higher level of market work. Hence, our model can reconcile an observed 
decline in social capital with a satisfactory GDP growth in the long run. Moreover, it accounts for 
the possibility that a decline in social capital is accompanied by a rise in hours of market work per 
household, which is consistent with the fact that a documented increase in market work per adult 
has occurred in the United States starting from the early 1970s (see, e.g., Freeman and Schettkat 
2005), namely in a period in which, according to Putnam, U.S. social capital has declined.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the model, section 3 characterizes the 
equilibrium trajectories of the economy, and section 4 concludes. 
2.   THE MODEL
We consider an economy in discrete time with an infinite time horizon. In this economy there 
are firms and households. 
2.1 The firms
For simplicity and without loss of generality, it is assumed that there is a fixed and large number 
(normalized to be one) of perfectly competitive firms that are identical and produce the single 
product existing in this economy. The representative firm produces its output Yt according to the 
technology
                                               
10 Our model follows the “social” approach to social capital, according to which social capital exists within a 
community and has to be considered as the (unintended) by-product of a large number of individual choices (see 
Bowles and Gintis 2002, Routledge and von Amsbergh 2003).
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 --1
t
β
t
α
ttt FKLAY  , >0, >0, +<1,                (1) 
where At denotes the state of technology in t, Lt are the units of labor employed by the firm in t, Kt
is the amount of capital rent by the firm in t, and Ft is a measure of the level of protection from 
opportunism, dishonesty and confiscation enjoyed by the firm in t. Note that Kt “should be 
interpreted broadly so as to include human as well as physical capital” (Aghion and Howitt 1998, 
11).
It is assumed that At is a positive function of the stock of human and physical capital 
existing in the economy: tt KA  (consistent with this formal set-up, one can interpret 
technological progress as labor augmenting). This assumption combines the idea that learning-by-
doing works through each firm’s (human and physical) capital utilization and the idea that 
knowledge and productivity gains spill over instantly across all firms (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
1995).11 Therefore, in accordance with Frankel (1962), it is supposed that although At is 
endogenous to the economy, each firm takes it as given since a single agent’s investment decisions 
have only a negligible effect on the aggregate stock of human and physical capital.
The variable Ft depends on the stock of social capital existing in the economy in period t, St, 
and on the amount of resources devoted by the firm to the protection from opportunistic and defiant 
behaviors, to the execution of contracts, and to the defense of property rights in t, Xt:
12  
                                               
11 Barro and Sala-i-Martin  point out that the absence of diminishing returns to capital becomes more realistic if we 
think of Kt in a broad sense to include both physical and human capital. 
12 The model is also open to the interpretation of St as an environmental asset. Consistent with this interpretation, one 
may suppose that an increasing amount of current output has to be used to preserve factor productivity as environmental 
quality worsens (for instance, more fertilizers and irrigation are needed to preserve land fertility as the global climate 
becomes less favorable to farming, or more medical care is needed to preserve labor productivity as air quality 
deteriorates). 
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

  

 .                           (2)
One may interpret St as a measure of the level of trust, work ethics and honesty existing in the 
society at time t. Hence, (2) captures a situation in which a decline in peer monitoring and informal 
sanctioning can be counterbalanced by an increase in the amount of resources invested in formal 
mechanisms of control and enforcement. In other words, (2) applies to those agency problems that 
emerge in contractual relationships and are exacerbated by a fall in mutual trust and shared values.13
However, (2) generalizes to other situations, such as those in which economic agents are exposed to 
the risk of crime or confiscation, that cannot be analyzed in terms of principal-agent relationships.  
Note also in (1) and (2) that a higher level of social capital raises total factor productivity and that 
Xt is a substitute for St, where =1 applies to the case in which Xt and St are perfect substitutes. 
Therefore, we admit the possibility that a private good can be used as a substitute for a “common”, 
namely for a form of capital that cannot be privately appropriated and accumulated. 
Since Xt is the amount of Yt used as intermediate service by the firm in t,
14 the value added 
generated by each firm is given by
GDPt=Yt-Xt, (3)
where Yt is the numeraire of the system and its price is set to be one. 
In each t, the representative firm chooses Xt, Lt and Kt in order to maximize its profits, which 
are given by 
t=Yt-Xt-WtLt-RtKt, (4)
                                               
13 Zak and Knack present a principal-agent model in which, when the social and institutional environment is 
characterized by low trust, principals spend more resources to monitor their agents, thus reducing investment and 
growth.
14 It is immaterial in this context whether the firm buys Xt from some other firm or it employs as intermediate good a 
portion of its own output.
Page 9 of 27
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
8
8
where Rt is the capital rental rate and Wt is the wage rate.
2.2 The law of motion of the social capital
      Across the social sciences, a recurring hypothesis is that the expansion of market activity may 
undermine the society’s ability to regenerate its social assets. According to this thesis, the level of 
generalized trust, civic engagement, public ethics and personal honesty may suffer because of the 
increased “marketization” of social life, which brings about as a by-product the diffusion of  
attitudes and values like greed, cynicism and opportunism. Obviously, this does not imply that no 
social capital can be accumulated as an intended consequence of some market activity: for instance, 
one may argue that social capital can also be built in the commercial workplace since most people 
socialize while working (see Maskell 2000). However, it is often the case that market activities 
subtract time and effort from other activities that are more productive in terms of social capital 
formation.15 Therefore, we maintain that the net effect of the increased marketization on social 
capital formation is negative, and we use the volume of goods and services that are produced for 
monetized exchange by profit-maximizing firms as a proxy of the degree of marketization. It is also 
assumed that the larger this volume, the higher has to be the stock of social capital in order to offset 
the detrimental effect of this greater degree of marketization on the level of generalized trust, civic 
engagement, public ethics and personal honesty. In other words, the stock of social capital declines 
whenever the ratio St/Yt tends to fall below a critical thresholds. Hence, we may summarize this 
discussion by modeling the evolution in time of the stock of social capital as follows:
                                               
15 There are models emphasizing the existence of a trade-off between using time to build social capital and devoting it 
to market activities. Chou (2002) proposes a growth model in which agents face a trade-off between devoting resources 
to final goods production, to human capital accumulation and to building social capital. Beugelsdijk and Smulders  
assume that the participation in intercommunity networks (“bridging” social capital) enhances growth by reducing the 
incentives for rent seeking and cheating, and it depresses growth by reducing the time devoted by people to market 
activities.
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t1t 


 , S0 given.                   (5)
It is worth emphasizing that Yt is the aggregate market output in period t: a single firm can take the 
evolution of St as given since it has only a negligible effect on it.
16
2.3 The households
For simplicity and without loss of generality, it is assumed that the population is constant and 
that each household contains one adult, working member of the current generation. Thus, there is a 
fixed and large number (normalized to be one) of identical adults who take account of the welfare 
and resources of their actual and prospective descendants. Following Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1995) we model this intergenerational interaction by imagining that the current generation 
maximizes utility and incorporates a budget constraint over an infinite future. That is, although 
individuals have finite lives, we consider immortal extended families (“dynasties”).17 Finally, we 
assume that agents’ expectations are rational, in the sense that they are consistent with the real 
processes followed by the relevant variables. In this framework, in which there is no source of 
random disturbances, this implies perfect foresight.
In each period t, the utility of the representative household is an increasing function of 
consumption and leisure:
Ut=ln(Ct)+ln(1-Lt), >0, Lt1,                                          (6)
where Ct is consumption in t and 1-Lt is the time devoted to leisure by the representative household 
(the total amount of time available to the household in each t is normalized to be one).
                                               
16 If one interprets St as an environmental asset affecting productivity, equation (5) may model the negative effect of  
aggregate production on the nature’s absorption capacity, namely on its capacity to preserve a certain level of 
environmental quality.
17 As Barro and Sala-i-Martin (60) point out, “this setting is appropriate if altruistic parents provide transfers to their 
children, who give in turn to their children, and so on. The immortal family corresponds to finite-lived individuals who 
are connected via a pattern of operative intergenerational transfers that are based on altruism”.
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The period budget constraint of the representative household is the following:
Kt+1+Ct=Kt(1-)+t+RtKt+WtLt, 0<<1, K0 given, (7)
where  is a parameter capturing (human and physical) capital depreciation. It is assumed that each 
household is entitled to receive an equal share of the firms’ profits.
The problem of the representative household amounts to choosing     0t01t C,K  and  0tL
in order to maximize  
1θ0  ,Uθ
0=t
t
t 

,              (8)
subject to (7), where  is a time-preference parameter.
2.4 Market-clearing conditions
Equilibrium in the market for the product implies
                                Kt+1+Ct= Kt(1-)+Yt-Xt. (9)
Equilibrium in the markets for labor and for human and physical capital implies, 
respectively,
s
t
d
t LL  (10)
and
s
t
d
t KK  . (11)
3. THE EQUILIBRIUM DYNAMICS OF THE ECONOMY 
3.1 Characterization of general equilibrium paths and balanced growth paths
By solving the optimization problem of firms and households, one obtains the system of 
difference equations in 
t
t
t K
X
V   and 
t
t
t X
S
Q   that governs the evolution of the economy along an 
equilibrium trajectory (see the Appendix available on the JEBO website):
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Together with (12)-(14), an equilibrium path must satisfy the transversality condition (see 
the Appendix)
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

.       (15)
A balanced growth path (BGP) can be characterized by setting Qt+1=Qt=Q and Vt+1=Vt=V 
in the system (12)-(13). There may exist a multiplicity of BGPs. Assuming that the parameter 
values are such that multiple BGPs exist (see the Appendix), the following proposition holds.
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Proposition 1. Per capita GDP grows faster along the BGP characterized by a lower Q (i.e., by a 
lower ratio between social capital and amount of resources invested in formal mechanisms of 
control and enforcement).
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 states that the economy is relatively poorer in social capital along the long-run 
equilibrium trajectory characterized by the higher rate of economic growth. This reflects the self-
feeding process whereby a fast growing market production induces the firms to increase their 
expenditures rapidly in formal mechanisms of control and enforcement in response to the relative 
decline in social capital brought about by this fast growth. 
3.2 Case in which St and Xt are perfect substitues (=1)
In this special case, the system governing the equilibrium path of the economy can also be 
expressed in terms of Lt and 
t
t
t K
S
D  , and one can show that there may exist at most two BGPs, 
(L°,D°) and (L*,D*), where L°>L* and D°=0<D* (see the Appendix). Assuming that both these 
BGPs exist (see the Appendix), one can prove the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Per capita GDP grows faster along the BGP characterized by more time worked per 
household and by a lower social capital-to-human and physical capital ratio.  
Proof: One can check that 0<h°=(L°,D°)>h*=(L*,D*) 


  
GDP
GDPGDP
g  g*,gentailing
t
t1t
t
(see the Appendix). 
Proposition 2 reinforces Proposition 1 in emphasizing that the economy tends to grow faster 
when it is relatively poorer in social capital: the rate of GDP growth is higher along the BGP 
characterized by a lower ratio between social capital and human & physical capital. Moreover, it 
states that along this BGP the households devote more time to market activities. As a matter of fact, 
the relative decline in social capital associated with a more rapid expansion of market activities is 
accompanied by the households’ tendency to accumulate more human and physical capital and to 
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supply more labor. It is worth noticing that a lower capital-to-human and physical capital ratio 
depresses profits per unit of capital since firms have to incur an increasing cost to offset the effects 
of the relative decline in social capital on their inputs’ productivity.
As =1, one can also prove the following proposition.
Proposition 3. The cumulative process that is ignited when the stock of social capital is low relative 
to the volume of market activities leads the economy to converge asymptotically to (L°,D°).
Proof: By linearizing the system governing the equilibrium path of the economy in a neighborhood 
of (L°,D°) and (L*,D*), one can check that  (L°,D°) is saddle-path stable, while (L*,D*) is unstable 
(see the Appendix). Hence, it is necessarily the case that if D0(D°, D°+), >0, the social capital-
human and physical capital ratio tends to approach D°=0 as t. 
Finally, one can focus on the transition path of this economy by studying the linearized 
system that governs the saddle path converging to (L°,D°) in the case in which =1:
1χ0  ,χDeD 1t1011t  ,     (16)
t
1021t χDeL-L  ,         (17)
where 



21
11
e
e  are the characteristic vectors associated with the stable root 1. The system (16)-(17) is 
such that the following proposition holds.
Proposition 4. Along the path converging asymptotically to (L°,D°), the social capital-human and
physical capital ratio decreases monotonically and the time worked per household increases 
monotonically.
Proof: One can check that e11=1 and e21<0 (see the Appendix). 
Proposition 4 establishes the negative relation linking the social capital-human and physical 
capital ratio and the households’ working time along an equilibrium trajectory converging 
asymptotically to the BGP: as time passes, Dt tends to fall while Lt tends to increase approaching 
asymptotically its long-run equilibrium value. This result is consistent with the negative correlation 
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that seems to have emerged in the last decades in the United States between some social capital 
measures and market work per capita.18
A corollary of Proposition 4 is the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Perpetual economic growth can be consistent with the progressive erosion of social 
capital.
Proof: By considering Proposition 4 and equations (5) and (12), one can easily verify that along the 
path converging to (L°,D°) the stock of social capital is asymptotically depleted. In addition, 
numerical examples show that one may have g°=h°=(L°,D°)>0 (see the Appendix). 
It is apparent that the content of Proposition 5, namely the fact that unbounded growth can 
occur in spite of the asymptotic depletion of social capital, relies on the possibility of substituting 
market services for the services provided by the stock of social capital. In the course of this process 
of substitution, costly formal mechanisms of control and enforcement gradually replace peer 
monitoring and informal sanctioning, without impeding unbounded growth.19
                                               
18 As evidence supporting the existence of this negative correlation, one can invoke the fact that market work per capita 
has increased in the United States during the years in which Putnam and others document a fall in social capital. 
Moreover, a negative relation between some indicators of social capital and some measures of market work emerges in 
specific studies. Costa and Kahn present evidence showing that the rise in female labor force participation that has taken 
place since the 1960s is an important determinant of the decline in the U.S. social capital. Keele finds that the increase 
in the hours worked per capita and the larger number of women in the labor force have a negative effect on the U.S. 
levels of civic participation and interpersonal trust. Bartolini and Bilancini (2007) provide evidence suggesting that the 
decline in U.S. social capital may have fostered women’s labor market participation.
19 We accept the idea that conformity to the behaviors prescribed by social organizations may be secured by a 
combination of materialistic incentives, coercion, conventions, social sanctions (informal rules) and internalized norms 
that make conformity a best response for the members of a group (see Bowles and Jayadev). Therefore, we do not 
emphasize an interpretation of the progressive erosion of social capital in advanced societies as the process whereby 
self-interest gradually replaces trust as the main inspiration of individual behavior in social organizations, but rather as 
the process whereby social sanctions and internalized norms gradually lose importance as motivations for inducing 
individuals to comply with the behaviors prescribed by institutions and organizations. 
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4.  CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have insisted on an interpretation of social capital as a resource connected 
with group membership and social networks (Bourdieu 1986) that tends to deteriorate as market 
activities become more pervasive. The deterioration of this resource can be interpreted as a decline 
in social cohesion and general trust that forces economic agents to raise their expenditure aimed at 
self-protecting from increased opportunism and defiant behavior. To shed light on the dynamics of  
an economy where social capital has these characteristics, we have augmented a Solow-Ramsey 
growth model by including: i) social capital enhancing factor productivity, ii) negative externalities 
affecting social capital formation and increasing with the level of market activity, iii) the possibility 
for economic agents to substitute market services for social capital, iv) positive externalities 
affecting total factor productivity and increasing with the aggregate stock of physical capital, and v) 
a labor-leisure choice.
Within this framework, the economy may have multiple balanced growth paths (BGPs), and  
per capita GDP grows faster along the BGP characterized by a lower ratio between social capital 
and amount of resources invested in formal mechanisms of control and enforcement. In the special 
case in which market services are perfect substitutes for the services provided by social capital, it is 
shown that i) the balanced growth path along which per capita GDP grows faster exhibits the lower 
ratio between social capital and physical capital, ii) the economy converges asymptotically to the 
balanced growth path along which per capita GDP grows faster, the households devote more time to 
market activities and the social capital to physical capital ratio is lower, iii) along the transition 
trajectory converging to the balanced growth path the social capital-physical capital ratio decreases 
monotonically and the time worked per household increases monotonically, and iv) perpetual 
growth can be consistent with the progressive erosion of social capital.
The model presented here is consistent with the view that capitalism tends to erode the 
socio-cultural sediment on which it rests, but it does not share the view that this erosion imperils the 
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growth prospects of the economy. In any case, we need systematic empirical evidence in order to 
assess how important are the impact of the expansion of market activities on social capital 
formation and the effects of the decline in social capital on the demand for market services that can 
substitute for it. Moreover, there are other elements of the relationship between social capital and 
economic growth that need to be clarified. In particular, future research should address the complex 
link connecting education and social capital and their joint impact on the growth process. Indeed, 
the existing literature has focused separately on various aspects of this connection, but without 
providing a formal framework for a unifying analysis of it.20 Finally, the emphasis on the 
relationship linking the education system to the society’s endowment of social capital naturally 
raises the question of the interaction between social capital and government institutions and policies 
in affecting growth. Again, the necessity of further research derives from the fact that the existing 
literature has not yet formally treated this complex issue.21      
Appendix
1. Derivation (12)-(15)
                                               
20 Among the issues treated by the existing literature there are the following: the alternative between devoting time to 
the acquisition of cognitive skills or to the formation of social capital (Piazza-Georgi 2002), the promotion of 
competitive motivations or cooperative attitudes among the young people attending schools, the role of social capital in 
facilitating the accumulation of human capital and in increasing its productivity (Coleman 1988, Chou 2002, Bjørnskov 
2004), the impact of schooling and the influence of human capital on the socialization process and on the formation of 
social capital (Bowles and Gintis 1976, Schneider et al. 1997).
21 A critical assessment of the theory concerning the relationship between government institutions and policies on one 
side and social capital on the other side should start from the commonly accepted conclusion “that centralised states 
destroy the social cohesion of traditional communities, undermine cooperation, and destroy trust among individuals” 
(Levi 1998, 81-82). At the same time, states are supposed to reduce the need for individuals to trust each other by   
providing effective monitoring and enforcement. In other words, according to this classical viewpoint, state coercion 
replaces interpersonal trust. However, constructing and preserving effective public institutions are themselves collective 
action problems that cannot be solved without some diffuse trust among citizens (see Rothstein 2000).
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One can solve the firms’ problem by maximizing (4) with respect to Xt, Lt, and Kt, thus obtaining
  

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Given (1)-(4) and (A1)-(A3), one has
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Notice that firms’ profits depend positively on social capital. This reflects the fact that a higher stock of social capital 
reduces the need for firms to devote resources to formal mechanisms of control and enforcement. 
By using (5) and (A5), one can derive (12). 
Moreover, one can solve the households’ problem by maximizing
 ]K-C-KRLWπδ)K-1[(λ)L-γln(1)Cln(θ 1ititititititititititit
0i
i



 with respect to Ct, Lt, 
Kt+1 and the Lagrangean multiplier t, and then by eliminating t, thus obtaining
)L-(1
γ
C
W
tt
t  ,    (A7)
)Rδ-1(θCC 1tt1t   ,           (A8)
ttttttt1t C-KRLWπδ)K-1(K  .    (A9)
By using (A1)-(A4) and (A7), one can derive (13) from (A8) and (14) from (A9). 
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Finally, by eliminating t, the transversality condition that an optimal path must satisfy is
0
C
Kθlim
t
tt
t


.                  (A10)
By using (A1)-(A3) and (A7), (A10) can be rewritten as in (15).
2. Numerical example showing the existence of multiple BGPs
Let =0.9523809; =0.6; =0.3; =0.09; =0.5897538; =0.9852931; =1.3315564; =0.01. Given these parameter 
values, there exist two BGPs characterized, respectively, by (Q°,V°) and by (Q*,V*), where Q°0; V°0.05619; 
L°0.6182; h°0.0627; Q*1.18; V*0.025; L*0.5982555; h*0.0584367.
3. Proof of Proposition 1
Considering equations (13) and (14), one has that along a BGP both these equations must hold:
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Note that equation (A11) can also be written as 
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Given (A12)-(A14), it is straightforward that a lower Q entails a higher h.
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To verify that a higher h entails a higher g, 
t
t1t
t GDP
GDPGDP
g
  , consider that along a BGP h=g. In its turn, this can 
be verified by considering that (A6) can be rewritten as 1-
1
ttt β)-α-1(βαQXGDP 









   and that along a BGP one 
has  Qt+1=Qt=Q and Vt+1=Vt=V, thus entailing h=g.  
4. Derivation of the system of equations governing the equilibrium path of the economy in the special case in which =1
If =1, one can obtain the following equations from the maximization of (4) with respect to Xt, Lt, and Kt:
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Given (1), (2), (4) and (A15)-(A17), one has
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By using (5), (A7)-(A9) and (A15)-(A19), one can derive 
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Together with (A20)-(A23), an equilibrium path must satisfy the transversality condition
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 5. Proof that if =1 there may exist at most two BGP, (L°,D°) and (L*,D*), where L°>L* and D°=0<D*
Considering (A20)-(A23), one has that D° and L° are those values of D and L which satisfy, respectively, D=0 and   
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Since 0
L
L)( 
d
df
, 0L1, it is apparent that only one value of L, L=L°, can satisfy (A25).
Again, considering (A20)-(A23), one has that L* and D* are those values of L and D which satisfy both
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Since 0
L
L)( 
d
dD
 and 0
L
L)( 
d
dh
, 0L1, it is apparent that only one pair of values of L and D, L=L* and D=D*, can 
satisfy (A26)-(A27).
Finally, one can verify by comparing (A25) and (A26), and by considering that 0
L
L)( 
d
df
, that the value of L 
satisfying (A11), L=L°, must be strictly greater than the value of L satisfying (A26), L=L*.
6. Numerical example showing that in the case in which =,1 there exist (L°,D°) and (L*,D*) , where g°>0
Let =1; =0.6; =0.3; =0.09; =0.5238455; =0.9441046; =0.288516; =0.002. Given these parameter values, one 
has two BGPs characterized, respectively, by (L°,D°) and by (L*,D*), where L°0.6182; D°0; h°=g°0.01828; 
L*0.60; D*0.03; h*=g*0.015137.
7. Proof of Proposition 2
By considering (A21), one can easily check that along a BGP the growth rate of Kt is given by
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, which is strictly increasing in L. Hence, since L°>L*, one must have h°>h*, thus 
entailing g°>g*.
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8. Proof of Proposition 3
To verify that (L°,D°) is saddle-path stable and (L*,D*) is unstable, consider that the characteristic equation of the 
system obtained by linearizing (A20)-(A21) around (L,D) is
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where 1 and 2 are the characteristic roots, 1-  -2,
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, and all derivatives 
are evaluated at (L,D). 
Given (A28), one has that
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where 0
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  . Moreover, one can check that 
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where 0
tL
 and 0
1tt LL
  , which implies 
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Hence, (L°,D°) is saddle-path stable, and (L*,D*) is unstable.
9. Proof of Proposition 4
To find the eigenvectors associated with the system (A20)-(A21) linearized in a neighborhood of (L*,D*), one must 
solve 
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